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In this paper,we construct a simplemodel that illustrates aperverse effect associatedwithpleabargaining
in which an increase in sanctions can lead to reduced deterrence. This ﬁnding is derived from the inter-
action of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining. In an environment with these institutional
features, higher sanctions are not always optimal when resources are limited, even if such sanctions are
costless. Such potential phenomenamay be useful in explaining the fact thatmany states have introduced
limitations on plea bargaining. Prosecutors being concerned with their conviction rates is necessary for
such a result to be present.
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1. Introduction
In the present U.S. judicial system, few criminal cases are deter-
mined by trial. In fact, approximately 90% of cases are resolved
by guilty pleas.1 Although television has popularized the idea that
plea bargains are made in exchange for information as studied by
Kobayashi (1992), the large majority of the plea bargains in reality
are done to save resources. Miceli (2007); Fisher (2000), or Landes
(1971) all pointed out that because of severe budgetary pressure on
prosecutors, thismethodof resolving cases is viewed as an essential
tool for managing large case loads. Plea bargaining saves money, or
perhapsweshouldmoreprecisely say that it saves time, by reducing
the time spent in court by both prosecutors and judges. Court time
is often seen as the most signiﬁcant constraint to a smoothly func-
tioning legal system. In fact, empirical evidence, dating as early as
Alschuler (1968), reveals that plea bargaining became more preva-
lent as these types of constraints became more binding.
Despite these advantages, there is a large opposition to plea bar-
gaining. In a 2004 memo on sentencing to all federal prosecutors,
the Justice Department imposed restrictions on plea bargaining.2
Five states3 have partial bans on plea bargaining, while eleven
states4 have some form of restrictions. In 1975, Alaska even intro-
duced a total ban on plea bargaining.5 Some lobby groups like 
Mother’s Against Drunk Driving (MADD) advocate for a total ban of 
plea bargaining in drinking and driving cases. According to Fisher 
(2000), people are concerned that plea bargaining is unfair and 
undermines the legitimacy of the legal system.
In a simple model that incorporates a constrained prosecutor, 
we will show that increased sanctions may lead to reduced deter-
rence when plea bargaining is taken into consideration. In other 
words, excessive use of plea bargaining can reduce the effectiveness 
of higher sanctions. There is a long list of theoretical and empirical 
research addressing the relative ineffectiveness of higher sanctions 
as documented by Polinsky and Shavell (2007) and Levitt and Miles 
(2007) in the ﬁrst Handbook of Law and Economics. Of special inter-
est for us is Andreoni (1991) who argued that the probability of 
conviction may fall as sentences rise if jurors use a reasonable doubt 
test. A similarly argument can be made about the use of plea bar-
gaining by prosecutors. Plea bargaining is characterized by a guilty 
plea, in which the defendant and the prosecutor agree to a division 
of the surplus created by the savings generated by avoiding trial. In 
order to provide more trial effort, the prosecutor must plea bargain 
with a larger fraction of cases. However, each plea bargain entails a 
reduced sanction, offsetting the beneﬁt of the increased sanction.
When prosecutors are socially benevolent, in the sense that min-
imizing criminal activity is their goal, they internalize all of the 
effects of plea bargaining. Consequently, a benevolent prosecutor is 
able to take advantage of the increase in sanction to reduce crime. 
However, when prosecutors have different objectives, this may no 
longer be the case. Many lawyers and economists acknowledge
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1 United States Sentencing Commission Data. Resolved cases are deﬁned as those
dealt with by guilty plea, dismissal or trial.
2 See the memo (http://news.ﬁndlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203
chrgmem.pdf) by Attorney General J. Ashcroft. In his memo, Ashcroft stated
that it is a prosecutor’s duty “to charge and to prove the most serious, readily
provable offense.” Plea-bargaining is only admissible if it is consistent with such
goal.
5 Rubinstein and White (1979) mention that even if formal plea bargaining is
banned, some bargaining takes place in the form of offense bargaining, where the
type of offense charged is what is bargained on.
3 CA, FL, MI, OR and PA.
4 AZ, AR, CO, KS, KY, ME, MS, NM, NY and WY.
2the fact that prosecutors may have career concerns. In particu-
lar, prosecutors may wish to signal their competence in order to
win re-election or to earn promotion. There are different ways
to evaluate a prosecutor’s competency using her track record, the
most frequently cited being the number of indictments, the con-
viction rate, and the total prison months. Since in this paper we
abstract from case selection, only the last two performance mea-
sures are relevant.6 There is evidence that prosecutors care about
both of these measures. Boylan (2005) shows that future career
outcomes of federal prosecutors are positively inﬂuenced by total
prison months, but not by conviction rates. He also pointed out the
fact that in general – as itwill be the case in our paper –maximizing
total prison months is consistent with welfare maximizing behav-
ior. Alternatively, an easily measured signal of performance is the
conviction rate. Early critics highlighted the potential link between
conviction rate and plea bargaining. On page 103, Raymond Moley
(1928) noted:
Equally important is the advantagewhichapleaof guilty gives to
the prosecuting attorney. He is not compelled to carry through
an onerous and protracted trial. He does not run the risk of los-
ing his case in the trial court. He runs no risk of having to oppose
an appeal to a higher court in case he wins the trial . . . What is
much more important to the prosecutor is the fact that in such
records as most prosecutors make of the work which they have
performed, a plea of guilty of any sort is counted as a convic-
tion, and when he goes before the voters for re-election he can
talk in large terms about securing convictions when, in reality,
these ‘convictions’ include all sorts of compromises. The district
attorney’s “record”, as he usually interprets it to the public, rests
upon the ratio of convictions to acquittals and means as much
to him as a batting average means to a baseball player.
This concern with “batting averages” does not seem to have
diminished. Rabin (1971) and Eisenstein (1978) show some
interview evidence of this objective among federal prosecutors.
Albonetti (1987) shows that the decision to prosecute is made
with a preference to avoid uncertainty. More importantly, Raghav,
Ramseyer, and Rasmusen (2005) show that appointed prosecu-
tors have lower conviction rates than elected ones, suggesting that
high conviction rates may be believed to have an electoral reward.
Gordon and Huber (2002) argue that under asymmetric informa-
tion it can be rational for voters to use a prosecutor’s conviction
rate as a performance measure. Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2001)
attributes part of the high conviction rates in Japan to the combi-
nation of prosecutors’ concerns with conviction rates and limited
budgets. Through a mechanism resembling the one presented in
this paper, Japanese prosecutors may inﬂate their conviction rates
using advantageous case selection. Glaser, Kessler, and Piehl (2000)
argue that the federalization of drug cases is due to the fact that
prosecutors care about winning high exposure cases, and that fed-
eral prosecutors take on more of these cases due to their deeper
pockets. Finally, a simple Google search on conviction rates yields
many District Attorney’s webpages that report information on con-
viction rates. For example, a website from the County of San Diego
reports:7
The District Attorney’s Ofﬁce is very proud of the fact that it has
a 94.2 percent conviction rate—one of the highest in the State of
California.
6 Boylan and Long (2005) argue that young prosecutors may which plea bargain
less often to accumulate “trial human capital”. This would imply that the perverse
effect of higher sanctions is more likely to be present with prosecutors who have
longer tenure.
7 See the webpage, http://www.sdcda.org/prosecuting/conviction.php.
Since there is evidence supporting both types of objective func-
tion, we assume that prosecutors are concerned with both to some
degree. For example, a state elected prosecutor may weigh more
heavily her “batting average”, while an appointed federal prosecu-
tor may be more concerned with total prison months.
We are not the only ones who argue that restrictions on plea
bargaining can be beneﬁcial, Bar-Gill and Gazal Ayal (2006) show
that imposing aminimumon sanction reductions canprevent inno-
cents from accepting guilty pleas. In our model, we do not consider
the problems of asymmetric information. If some agents are inno-
cent, they might want to go to trial in order to separate themselves
fromguilty defendants as inGrossmanandKatz (1983). Prosecutors
and defendants could also possess different information about the
strength of theprosecutor’s case, as discussed inReinganum(1988).
Baker and Mezzetti (2001) also consider a game of asymmetric
information.8
In the next section of the paper, we discuss the basic model and
derive agent behavior. We, then characterize the equilibrium level
of crime, and look at the effects of increasing sanctions. All proofs
are in Appendix A.
2. The model
There is a measure one of risk neutral agents indexed by their
criminal aptitude  ∈ [0,1], which is uniformly distributed. More
able agents are assumed to extract more rents from criminal activ-
ities, so the associate payoff is simply . If agents do not commit
a crime, they receive a reservation utility which is normalized to
zero.
If an agent commits a crime, he will be caught with probabil-
ity  > 0. For simplicity, we assume that no innocent agents are
charged.9 Weassumethatprosecutors cannotobserve; and, there-
fore, no sentences or plea bargains are conditioned on the agent’s
ability. The expected sanction from going to trial is the product of
the legislated sanction S and the probability of conviction.10 The
probability of conviction is given by P(e), where e is the effort pro-
vided by the prosecutor in charge of the case. Naturally, P′(e) > 0
and P′′(e) < 0. The cost of going to trial for the prosecutor is sim-
ply the effort level e. With some probability , the defendant is
offered a plea bargain by the prosecutor. The resulting sentence B is
the outcome of a bargaining game between the defendant and the
prosecutor.
Let ¯ denote the agent who is indifferent between committing a
crime and receiving his reservation utility. This agent is implicitly
deﬁned by
¯ = [(1 − )P(e)S + B]. (1)
All agents with  ≥ ¯ choose to commit a crime, and all agents
 < ¯ choose not to. Therefore, 1 − ¯ is the total proportion of crim-
inals in the economy.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, all agents choose
whether or not to commit a crime. A fraction  of all criminals is
arrested. The prosecutor, taking the crime rate as given, chooses to
8 For a general discussion of asymmetric information, uncertainty, and agency
costs in plea bargaining, see Garoupa and Stephen (2006).
9 This assumption allows us to abstract from information based arguments about
theguilt of adefendant indesigningpleabargaining. This typeof argumentshasbeen
widely investigated in the literature, for example see Grossman and Katz (1983). In
reality, a defendant does not have to be objectively innocent to avoid conviction. For
example, the prosecutor could fail to turn exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady
vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1969), or the defense may show that the police conducted
an unreasonable search or seizure. Effort by both the defendant and the prosecutor
can consequently affect the probability of conviction, even if the defendant is in fact
guilty.
10 Since we want to discuss judicial procedures, we assume that there is always
some level of crime in equilibrium. Assuming that S < 1 is one way to ensure this.
3bargainwith of the arrested criminals given the limited resources.
If an agreement is reached during plea bargaining, the defendant
pleads guilty and the agreed sanction B is imposed. The cost of such
a plea is assumed to be zero. If the two parties are unable to reach
an agreement, the case is transferred to court. The court process is
simple. The prosecutor chooses effort levels e, and the defendant is
found guilty with probability P(e), in which case the sanction S is
imposed.
In previous work, prosecutors have been modeled as maximiz-
ing total expected sentences as in Landes (1974), or socialwelfare as
in Grossman and Katz (1983) and Reinganum (1988). Obviously, if
prosecutorswere tohaveunlimitedbudgets, the twoobjectivesmay
differ; a prosecutor who maximizes expected sentences may dedi-
cate too many resources to this objective. However, when the total
prosecutorial budget is ﬁxed, both of those objectives can be equiv-
alent; the cost of prosecutorial effort does not enter in the objective
function of the prosecutor, it enters as a constraint instead.11 Con-
sequently, maximizing the per defendant expected sentences can
be thought of as having one of two motives. The prosecutor may
be maximizing deterrence, therefore, acting in the social interest.
Alternatively, the prosecutor may be self-interested, and higher
total sentences contribute to furthering their career as suggested
by Boylan (2005). We also allow prosecutors to independently care
about their conviction rates, as motivated in the introduction. Pros-
ecutors are assumed to be maximizing a weighted sum of the
expected average sentence and the conviction rate. This objective
function is given by
[, e] = (1 − ı)[(1 − )P(e)S + B] + ı[(1 − )P(e) + ], (2)
where ı represents theweight put on conviction rates. For example,
elected prosecutors could be facing a larger ı, which is consistent
with the empirical literature discussed previously.
The trial stage is very simple. The prosecutor is resource con-
strained, which can be interpreted as the total time or ﬁnancial
resources available. Given these resourcesM, the prosecutor’s effort
level e at each trial is a function of plea bargaining rate . More
precisely the level of effort at each trial is determined by:
e() = M
(1 − )(1 − ¯)
, (3)
where the plea bargaining rate  is determined in the previous
stage. Obviously, an increase in the number of cases plea bargained
allows the prosecutor to devote more effort in each trial, so e() is
increasing in .
Alternatively cases can be resolved by guilty pleas. Entering into
a plea bargain results in the defendant pleading guilty and receiving
an agreed upon sentence, which we denote by B. A plea bargain
divides the surplus generated by foregoing trial. In particular, the
defendant beneﬁts from having his sentence reduced by P(e())S −
B. The prosecutor loses from receiving a lower expected sentence,
but saves the cost of the trial, e().
We assume aNash bargaining solution, where the resulting plea
bargain is given by B = P(e())S − ˛e(), where ˛ represents the
defendant’s bargaining power and therefore the share of the bar-
gaining surplushe receives. Rubinstein andWhite (1979) found that
following Alaska’s ban on plea bargaining, sentences for Class 3
(burglary, larceny, etc.) increased by 53%, while sentences for Class
4 (fraud, forgery, etc.) and Class 5 (drug felonies) increased by 117%
11 Imagine a simple environment where a prosecutor allocates effort e1 and e2
to two cases involving the same sanction S, and probabilities of conviction P1(e1)
and P2(e2). If a prosecutor cares about expected sanctions, she will try to maximise
P1(e1)S + P2(e1)S, while a procecutor who care about social welfare may maximize
P1(e1)S + P2(e1)S − e1 − e2. If the two procecutors face the constraint e1 + e2 = M,
both objectives coincide. In the context of our model, the two objectives differ
slightly, but all the tradeoffs operate in the same way.
and 223% respectively. This suggests that reduced sanctions were a
consequence of plea bargaining, and that the defendant’s bargain-
ing power was not negligible. Obviously, if ˛ is low, the reduction
in deterrence associated with the use of plea bargaining will also
be small. Note that an increase in the legislated sanction S leads
directly to an increase in the plea bargained sanction B.
The central decision this paper tries to address is the determina-
tion of how many cases get offered a plea, and of those offers how
many are accepted.12 As Miceli (2007) pointed out that with com-
mon information, if defendants care about the expected sanction
plus legal cost, while prosecutors care about the expected sanction
net of those costs, there will always exist a negotiated sentence
thatmakes both parties better off. In such an environment, all cases
wouldbe resolvedout of court. There exist important features of the
judicial process that may prevent prosecutors and defendants from
reaching agreements. For example, if the parties’ evaluations of the
strength of the case diverges, trial may be unavoidable as discussed
in Priest and Klein (1984) or Reinganum (1988). In our model, none
of these reasons are present, and so as is expected defendants will
always accept offers. Prosecutors however, will not offer a plea to
every defendant. This is because prosecutors are not assumed to
maximize expected sentences net of cost, they maximize expected
sentences and/or conviction rates subject to the resources avail-
able. Even a prosecutor who cares only about expected sentences
will choose tobring somecases to court. Thebeneﬁt of pleabargain-
ing is that it allows more resources to be devoted to cases that go to
court, but at a cost of it reducing sentences on plea bargained cases.
When choosing how many cases to plea bargain with, a prosecutor
is able exploit the trade off that exists between the number of plea
bargains and the amount of effort at each trial. A prosecutor chooses
the proportion of cases to plea bargainwith tomaximize[, e()].
The trade-off is fairly simple. Imagine a prosecutor who only cares
about maximizing expected sentences (ı = 0). Increasing the num-
ber of pleas directly reduces the expected sanction by ˛e() due to
the more lenient sentences. However, it also free up resources and
increases the probability of conviction in cases that ultimately go
to court. A prosecutor concerned with conviction rates (ı > 0) will
have evenmore incentive to plea bargain. Not only does it increases
the probability of winning trials, it also directly increases the con-
viction rate by securing convictions with certainty in all the cases
resolved in this manner.
Lemma 1. The proportion of cases resolved through plea bargaining
increases with the sentence S.
When the sanction S increases, the marginal beneﬁt of increas-
ing the probability of winning a case for the prosecutor goes up.
So, the prosecutor prefers to plea more often and beneﬁt from the
higher probability of winning cases taken to trial.
The equilibrium level of crime in this economy can be solved
using the behavior derived above. Given the number of cases, the
prosecutorwill plea bargainwith a proportion ∗. The effort in each
trial is givenby e(∗). For cases resolvedbypleabargain, the reduced
sanction isB = P(e(∗))S − ˛e(∗). Finally, only individualswith  >
¯ choose to a commit crime. The equilibrium level of crime satisﬁes
all of these conditions.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium with a positive
crime rate.
12 Plea bargains are allocated randomly since prosecutors cannot observe . This
allocation may appear ‘unfair’. If  were observable, a deterrence-motivated pros-
ecutor would allocate plea bargains to the most severe criminals in order to target
trial effort and therefore punishment severity at the marginal criminals who it may
be possible to deter. In this way, unless fairness was explicitly included in the prose-
cutorial objective, more information would result in an even more ‘unfair’ allocation
of sentences.
4Obviously, an increase in the legislated sentence directly
changes the expected outcomeof trial, aswell as the resulting sanc-
tion from a plea bargain. It also alters the likelihood of trial relative
to a guilty plea. Through these avenues, it inﬂuences the crime rate.
Proposition 2. The crime rate is increasing with the legislated sanc-
tion S if the prosecutor is sufﬁciently concerned with the conviction
rate.
When theprosecutor cares only about expected sanction (ı = 0),
there is no conﬂict between her objective and deterrence maxi-
mization. Therefore, such a prosecutor cannot do worse when the
sanction increases. She will only increase plea bargaining to the
point where it maximizes crime reduction. However, if the prose-
cutor is concerned with her conviction rate, this result may change.
A prosecutor with such an objective, will plea bargain too often to
keep her conviction rate high, which can have a detrimental effect
on overall deterrence. This becomes more problematic when sanc-
tions are high because the reduction in sentence ˛e is larger. Higher
sentences imply thatmore effort is devoted at trial, and so plea bar-
gaining generates larger savings. Since defendants get a share ˛ of
these savings the negative effect on deterrence is more likely with
higher sentences.
Other aspects of the judicial system contribute to this result. For
example, how much extra effort can be allocated per case follow-
ing an increase in the sanction ( ∂e()
∂
∂(S)
∂S
) and the effectiveness of
such an increase in effort (P′(·)) also contribute to this result. Intu-
itively, when effort is very effective at trial, prosecutors concerned
with conviction rate have a larger beneﬁt fromplea bargaining. This
translates into too few cases going to trial, and to lower overall
expected sentences.
In a more dynamic version of this model, increased crime rates
could lead tomore cases andcongestion in the legal systemwhich in
turn could lead to more plea bargaining. This indirect effect would
magnify the initial reduction in deterrence.
Before concluding, it is important to point out that we chosen
to completely ignore defendants’ trial effort decisions. The inclu-
sion of such effort choices would likely only reinforce our results.
First, with defendants’ effort the total surplus generated by plea
bargaining would be more substantial, and therefore so would the
reduction in the overall cost associated with crime for a defendant
who accepts a plea. Let f denote the cost of trial for a defendant. The
bargained sentencewould then be given by PS − ˛(e − f ) as pointed
out in Miceli (2007), and the overall cost associated with crime for
such individual would only be PS − ˛e − (1 − ˛)f . Secondly, with
harsher potential punishments imposed at trial, defendants would
have more incentive to provide additional effort at trial, so higher
f. As discussed in Sanchirico (2007), it is important to acknowledge
that the probability a prosecutorwins a trial depends of the relative
efforts provided by both parties, e/e + f for example. Consequently,
prosecutors’ conviction rates would suffer due to the increase in
defendants’ efforts. Prosecutors who are overly concerned with
their conviction rates would react by increasing their own trial
effort, and the only way to do it given the resources available is
to plea bargain more often.
3. Conclusion
Policies to limit plea bargaining have been implemented. For
example, 13 US states have done so for DWI infractions. This can
be viewed as response to the argument that plea bargaining under-
mines the effectiveness of sanctions. Another method of deterring
crimewould be to increase the budgets and number of prosecutors.
However, given the current judicial system, where less than 10% of
cases go to trial, the budget necessary to take a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of cases to trial seems infeasible. Alternatively, one could
reduce the cost of trial directly: for example, by reducing theburden
of proof. However, this possibility has other obvious disadvantages
in a system where guilt is to be ascertained.
Not all forms of harsher punishments will cause the same
response. For example, the “Three strikes” laws, like those in Cali-
fornia, where a third felony conviction results in life-imprisonment
may reduce the beneﬁts of plea bargaining to career criminals. Even
if thedefendant is risk-neutral, and theexpected sentence fromplea
bargaining is less than that of going to trial, the defendant may not
wish to plead guilty to a felony, andmay rather risk being sentenced
to a much more severe sanction in the hope of being found inno-
cent. The beneﬁt to being found innocent is now much higher than
in a system where punishment increases more slowly following
previous guilty decisions.
This paper also highlights a weakness of relying on conviction
rates as a measure of prosecutor performance. Of course, too much
concern with high conviction rates has obvious disadvantages in a
system where prosecutors are relied upon to ascertain guilt. How-
ever, even in this environmentwhere all defendants are guilty, such
a relianceonconviction ratemeasuresmayhaveaperverseeffect on
the level of deterrence by encouraging too many and too generous
plea bargains.
Although beyond the scope of this paper, our model suggests
some empirical implications that would be worth exploring in
future work. Perhaps, most directly, it suggests that the generos-
ity of pleas should be positively correlated with their frequency in
a jurisdiction. It also suggests that we should observe more plea
bargaining and more generous plea bargains in jurisdictions with
elected prosecutors than in those with appointed prosecutors.
Obviously, this model lacks important features of the judicial
process that motivate the use of plea bargains. Most importantly,
we do not incorporate risk aversion which is a primary reason why
prosecutors and defendants reach agreements. In this model, we
also donot consider the problems of asymmetric information about
agents’ guilt or innocence. If some agents are innocent, they might
want to go to trial in order to separate themselves fromguiltydefen-
dants as in Grossman and Katz (1983). Prosecutors and defendants
could also possess different information about the strength of the
prosecutor’s case, as discussed in Reinganum (1988). Baker and
Mezzetti (2001) also consider a game of asymmetric information.
But even if all those features were to be introduced, it would still be
true that a reduction in deterrence could be driven by an increase
in trial costs and binding budgets.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. The ﬁrst order condition of the prosecutor’s
maximization problem is given by:
(1 − ı)
{
−˛e() + [P ′(·)S − ˛]∂e()
∂
}
+ ı
{
(1 − )P ′(·)∂e()
∂
+ [1 − P(·)]
}
= 0.
5Using the fact that ∂e()/∂ = e()/(1 − ), we can show that
the prosecutor’s optimal level of plea ∗ is given by:
P′(e(∗))S − ˛ = − ı
1 − ı (1 − 
∗)[P ′(e(∗)) + 1 − P(e(∗))].
Comparative static analysis shows that:
∂(S)
∂S
= −P
′(·)
(S/(1 − ∗)) + (ı/(1 − ı))P ′′(·)e(∗)
− (ı/(1 − ı))P ′(·)[1 + e(∗)]
.
The expression above is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The crime rate in this economy is given
by
1 − ¯(S) = 1 − [P(e(S))S − (S)˛e(S)], (A1)
and from the prosecutor’s budget constraint we know that (S) =
1 − M/[1 − ¯(S)]e(S). Consequently, the equilibrium level of ¯(S)
solves the following equation:
¯(S) = [P(e(S))S − ˛e(S)] + ˛ M
1 − ¯(S)
. (A2)
First, note that the left hand side of this equation is an increasing
linear functionof ¯,while the righthandside is an increasing convex
function of ¯. More importantly, note that at ¯ = 0, the left hand
side of Eq. A2, is smaller than the right hand side. This implies that
the cost of being a criminal for the least able agent always exceeds
the beneﬁt. Since we assumed that S < 1, the left hand side of Eq.
A2 is larger than the right hand side for  = 1, implying that the
beneﬁt of committing crime for themost able agent always exceeds
the cost. Consequently, there exists one equilibrium with a positive
crime rate. Given that we have a unique equilibrium, the stability
condition will be satisﬁed. It is to say that the slope of the right
hand side of Eq. A2 is smaller than one. This property will be used
in the proof of proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Comparative statics in Eq. A2 reveal that
∂¯(S)
∂S
= P(·) + [P
′(·)S − ˛]∂e(S)/∂S
1 − ˛(M/[1 − ¯(S)]2)
.
First, note that given the stability condition, the denominator
has to be positive. Using the prosecutor’s ﬁrst order condition, the
derivative above can be re-written as
∂¯(S)
∂S
= P(·) − (ı/(1 − ı))(1 − 
∗)[P ′(·) + 1 − P(·)]∂e(S)/∂S
1 − ˛(M/[1 − ¯(S)]2)
.
If ı/1 − ı[P ′(·) + 1 − P(·)]e(∗)∂∗/∂S > P(·), then the crime rate
would be an increasing function of the sanction S. A neces-
sary condition for crime to be increasing in S is that ı be large
enough. 
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